Introduction to DNS and its Security Challenges

Meet the Problems

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Game Plan

- Recap on what DNS is and does.
- Security implications of DNS.
- Privacy implication of DNS.
- Questions/discussion/open mike session.

Recap: Previously on “Your Life with DNS (Even If You Did not Know It Was There)”

What is DNS?

- DNS is the “Domain Name System”.
- A means for users of computer systems to map “host names” to IP addresses.
- Decentralized and hierarchical.
- Originally defined in RFC 882 and RFC 883 (November 1983).
- Supersedes the completely-decentralized concept of “host files” which are a nightmare to maintain.

General Concept

- DNS provides technical information about a host name or a domain that a client can request:
  - Mapping of host names to IP addresses,
  - redirections of host names to other host names,
  - mail servers responsible for a given host/domain,
  - DNS servers responsible for a given host/domain,
  - CAs allowed to issue certificates for a given host/domain,
  - and a **lot** of other things.
- Communication via UDP or TCP port 53

Structure of the DNS

- DNS is **hierarchical**:
  - All requests first go to the 13 well-known root servers.
  - Next step is the server responsible for the top-level domain.
  - … then for the second-level domain
  - … then for the next-level domain
  - until the end is reached: the authoritative server.
  - Finally, the actual request goes to that server.
- For performance reasons, replies are cached.
- All the above is usually done by a **resolver**.

DNS Security Implications

First Things First: Fakes

The obvious problem: No authentication.

→ DNS replies can be forged or altered.

Result: You will be redirected to an IP address of the attacker’s choice instead of your legitimate target.

This can also be done via **cache poisoning** of **resolvers** (no interception capabilities required)!

Advanced attack: Injecting malicious data into legitimate **name servers**.

Denial of Service – Attacking You

- Attacker targets **your** ability to **use** DNS by hitting your **resolvers**.
- Denies **you** normal use of the internet.
- Typical example: Overloading by flooding with requests.
- Other possible attack methods include cache poisoning, flooding with (fake) answers, ...

Denial of Service – Attacking Your Services

- Attacker targets **your** ability to **provide** DNS services by hitting your **name servers**.
- Denies **everybody** the normal use of your services.
- Attack methods identical to previous attack.
- Crucial difference: DNS servers are meant to be reachable from third parties → this facilitates many attacks.

Denial of Service – Attacking Third Parties

- Attacker targets a **third party's** ability to use the internet by hitting their connectivity.
- Denies **the victim** normal use of their internet uplink.
- Attack method: Send spoofed DNS requests to **your** name servers and/or resolvers with faked sender IP addresses ("DNS reflection").
- If done properly, this amplifies the attack force ("DNS amplification").

Data Leakage – Reconnaissance

- Attackers can request information about an entire DNS zone (“zone transfer”).
- If the name server is configured loosely, then all information will be handed over upon request.
- If the name server does not allow zone transfers, then hosts can be enumerated if they have DNS name records. (Might take a while though, obviously.)

Covert Communication Channels – Data Leakage

- DNS queries can be used to exfiltrate data.
- Not really preventable (unless DNS queries are whitelisted in advance).
- Very hard to detect (if done properly).
- Very low bandwidth.

Covert Communication Channels – Command & Control

- Replies to DNS queries can transport arbitrary data fairly reliably.
- Albeit at a very low bandwidth.
- Can be and is sometimes used by malware to communicate with command-and-control servers (or as a VPN: “DNS tunnelling”).
- (Not to be confused with concepts like fast-flux domain hopping – that is meant to **locate** command-and-control servers in a sneaky but reliable way.)

DNS Privacy Implications

Breadcrumbs – Privacy of Clients or Organisations

- Client network activity usually requires DNS queries.
- A lot can be learned or inferred from these queries.
- Therefore, just using DNS leaks some information about client activity.
- **At least** the first-hop resolver can, in principle, snoop on you.
- More “remote” resolvers can only infer less accurate information, but they still can.

Data Leakage – Privacy Spin

- Severity of this depends on your levels of concern and/or local juristiction, but:
- If computer names are aligned with their main users, for instance like this:

  `dussa-desktop.dfn-cert.de`

  then your name server effectively enumerates your staff.
- (Plus, `trump-notebook.whitehouse.gov` might become a priority target.)

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Thank you

Any questions?

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Bonus Track:
Split DNS

Split DNS – Basics

- Also known as “split-horizon DNS,” “split-view DNS,” “split-brain DNS.”
- “Splits” the DNS “world” into two (or more) parts.
- Answer to DNS queries depend on what “part of the world” the query comes from.
- Often based on the query source IP address.

Split DNS – Use Cases in Practice

- Security should **not** be based solely on Split DNS.
- Often used as a barrier to enhance privacy and make reconnaissance harder.
- Common use cases:
  - Internal versus external view, for instance, of a university: Services that should be used only internally are not announced to the outside.
  - Improved load balancing or connectivity, for instance by returning “physically close” IP addresses for a given host name, based on the source’s geolocation.

Split DNS – Challenges

- If not implemented properly, Split DNS easily collides with DNSSEC, which verifies that a DNS response is unchanged and authentic.
- However, if implemented carefully, most problems can be avoided; see the IETF's (expired) guideline:
  `Split-View DNSSEC Operational Practices`
- Another potential headache with regard to security: IPSec. See RFC8598:
  `Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2`